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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate an audit policy that allows a regulator to control
past declarations of an agent who is caught to fraud in the current period or to
adopt an action that is not desirable for Society. Coupled with redistribution
eﬀects due to the production of a public good, we show that retroactivity has
not always the desired eﬀect on the level of evasion or the level of eﬀort, once
the agent has decided to deviate from a given objective. Nevertheless, we derive
conditions under which retroactivity lessens fraudulent behaviors, in quantity and
in value. As a related result, authorities should communicate about how they use
the individual contributions but information should not be completely transparent
in order to ﬁght eﬃciently against deviation. Redistribution and retroactivity may
have opposite eﬀects on the behavior of the agent when combined together.
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1 Introduction
This paper deals with a standard issue of agency, where an agent has to take a decision
about a variable that inﬂuences the revenue of a principal, but that cannot be observed
by him without cost. This variable could be a taxable income to be declared by a
taxpayer to the ﬁscal authorities or a level of environmental eﬀort that ﬁrms or farmers
should apply. The agent cheats if he does not declare the eﬀective level of revenue or
eﬀort. The literature on tax evasion1 often deals with the optimal design of economic
tools to ﬁght against cheating, as in the seminal paper of Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
which is considered as a benchmark2. The authors focus on an agent who has to decide
which amount of his taxable income to declare to the authorities in order to maximize his
private expected revenue, knowing the inspection probability and the penalty in case of
fraud detection. By imposing penalties on the unpaid taxes rather than on the undeclared
revenue as in Allingham and Sandmo, Yitzhaki (1974) shows that an increase in the tax
rate always leads to more honnesty when the preferences of the agents display decreasing
absolute risk aversion. Many contributions followed these two reference papers, dealing
either with the optimal levels of ﬁnes and audit probabilities or with the design of optimal
audit schemes (Witte and Woodbury, 1977; Feinstein, 1991; Collins and Plumlee, 1991;
Alm et al., 1992; Jung et al., 1994). In almost all papers the audit policy design takes
into account only the current period, neglecting the fact that agents’ decisions are linked
1Actually, the literature related to income taxation makes a diﬀerence between evasion and fraud.
While fraud refers to an out-of-law act, with false declaration, evasion refers to revenues on which no
taxes are collected because their owners have found ways to prevent from paying them. In this paper, we
will refer to ﬁscal policy but our results will also be discussed in the context of environmental economics
a n dw ew i l lu s ei n d i ﬀerently both terms fraud and evasion.
2The interested reader can also read Srinivasan (1973).
2over time. There are exceptions that consider policy design for which the probability
of audit depends on the past behavior of the agent. In the context of ﬁscal evasion,
Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) and Greenberg (1984) propose an audit scheme for
which the current audit probability is conditionned on the results of past audits. In
this scheme detected cheaters are inspected with a diﬀerent probability than detected
honnest tax payers. Harrington (1988) proposes a policy where the probability of audit
depends on past periods, with an aplication to environmental policies.
In this paper, we propose an audit scheme that takes into account past periods
through retroactive auditing: If an agent is audited in the current period and detected
to be cheating, the inspection is extented to a certain number of previous periods. If
fraud is detected on previous periods, the agent must reimburse all undeclared revenues,
and additionally he is liable for a penalty that applied on the total amount evaded. To
the best of our knowledge, no paper on environmental economics and only one paper
on tax evasion has considered such type of instrument (Rickard et al., 1982). This is
rather surprising, since retroactive audit is quite commonly used in practice by ﬁscal
authorities (France, England, ....). From a theoretical point of view, allowing retroactive
audit enlarges the set of instruments available for preventing fraud. This type of policy
is of particular interest when the authority (or the principal) is confronted to repeated
interactions with a group of tax payers or agents whose declarations or actions are subject
to a (partially) random income. This is the case for tax declaration since agents have
to decide each year the amount of their current revenue to be declared. Furthermore
from one year to another, they may change their behavior, switching fromhonnesty to a
little bit of cheating or to strong cheating. The fact that agents face a random income
each period is an important assumption. Otherwise, the principal might ultimately
discover each agent’s income level if there are enough periods. More important even is
the assumption that future income is not predictable on the basis of past realizations.
Otherwise the authority could know exactly the future incomes of all agents. From
a practical point of view these assumptions are reasonable since many taxpayers have
3some random component in their income3, and we might also think about a population
of taxpayers that is subject to entries and exits. Retroactive audit is also likely to
improve environmental policy instruments when damage to the environment is due to
repeated actions. As an important example, the pollution of groundwater by nitrates
due to excessive or inappropriate fertilization by farmers appears only after several years.
Besides, because of the cumulative nature of the process, it takes a long time to stabilize
t h ep o l l u t i o nf r o mt h em o m e n tw h e r em o r ee n vironment-friendly actions are taken. In
that case, implementing dynamic environmental policies seems to be well suited for this
kind of issue. The ideas developped in this paper hopefully contribute to solve, at least
partially, this speciﬁc issue.
Our model is based on redistribution. Therefore collected taxes are used to produce
public goods, while environmental eﬀorts produce a public beneﬁt. This implies that
misreporting is no longer exclusively linked to the probability of audit. Since the agent
beneﬁts from the increase in the public good, his evasion strategy takes into account the
direct eﬀect on the level of public good. Symetrically, the behavior of the other agents
will aﬀect the private expected revenue of the agent through the level of production of
the public good. As a consequence an increase in the probability of audit makes fraud
more risky for the agent, but also increases the expected total contribution to the public
good since the dishonnest agents will be caught more frequently.
One of our main results is that agents’ revenue may increase when the audit proba-
bility increases because of the public good eﬀect. Besides, retroactivity does not always
provide suﬃcient incentives to be honnest since the public good eﬀe c ti n c r e a s e st h ee x -
pected revenue of the agent and creates a substitution eﬀect. Nevertheless, under some
conditions, dishonnest agents will more frequently become honnest when retroactive au-
dit is implemented. Lastly, the regulator will have to decide which part of collected
taxes and penalties will be dedicated to the production of the public good, knowing
that the remaining amount will be used for implementing the audit policy in the next
3This is also the case for farmers whose incomes are subject to climate. This case is discussed in the
last section of the paper.
4period. The optimal allocation of tax revenues depends on the relative eﬃciency of audit
compared to the productivity of the public good, and it maximizes the expected social
welfare subject to a ﬁnancial constraint. In contrast to the standard treatment of tax
policies in the literature, our assumptions imply that the behavior of the tax authorities
is endogenous, since their current audit policy depend on the past behavior of the agents.
All our results are derived with risk-neutral agents.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section displays results obtained
when agents take into account the production of a public good under standard, non
retroactive, audit. In the third section, we develop a more sophisticated model with
both redistribution due to the presence of a public good and retroactive audit. Section
four concludes the paper and discusses some interesting extensions of this work, especially
in the frame of experimental economics. We also propose a discussion on environmental
economics.
2 Redistribution and non retroactive audit
In this section and in the following one, we deal with the behavior of a taxpayer. In the
last section, we will discuss our results in the context of environmental economics.
Consider N risk-neutral agents in the economy4. Each agent i earns, at each period
t, a random revenue e wt















independent from one period to another. The realized revenue is deﬁned as the taxable
income that the agent must declare to the authorities. Hence, if he is honnest, the agent
declares all his revenue. Nevertheless, he can decide, at each period, to only declare
an amount xt
i,w i t hxt
i ≤ wt
i,s ot h a t(wt
i − xt
i) i st h ea m o u n to ft a x a b l er e v e n u et h a t
is evaded by Agent i at date t. The tax rate imposed by the Authorities is assumed
to be constant over time and linear in the declared revenue: It is strictly positive and
4We adopt the assumption of risk-neutrality in order to be able to isolate the impact of retroactivity
and redistribution on the behavior of the agent.
5denoted as τ. Hence the total amount of tax paid by the agent if he is not caught in
evading is τxt
i. At each period, his declaration is audited with probability πt.I f t h e
agent is audited, the tax authorities observe his eﬀective taxable income perfectly. If the
agent has evaded some of his income, he must pay back the amount of taxes he tried to
evade, that is τ (wt
i − xt
i), plus a penalty deﬁned as a rate β applied to the evaded tax.
In this section, we assume that audit applies only to the current period t for which it is
implemented: No retroactivity takes place. Let us denote Tt the total amount of taxes





















Taxes are partly redistributed to the agents through income redistributions or build-
ing of public infrastructures and partly used to ﬁnance future audits. Precisely, we
assume that a share αt of the collected taxes and penalties of the current period is in-
vested in the production of a public good in the current period, while the remaining is
allocated to the ﬁnancing of audit in the next period. Hence, denoting nt the number of
audits in period t and letting C be the ﬁxed unit cost of an audit, the regulator’s budget






This equality allows us to deﬁne the probability of audit as a function of the past







This hypothesis has two important features. First, it is consistent with reality know-
ing that the budget of a governement for Period t +1is usually adopted at the end of
Period t. Consequently, the budget is ﬁxed for Period t+1and it can only be increased
through external funds5. This fact allows us to derive comparative statics (see Section 3)
5Such non anticipated funds could be, for instance, the fruits of a sudden increase in the gross interior
product at the end of Period t.
6about the relation between the income declaration of the agent and the audit probabil-
ity. Second, Condition 2 highlights an important strategic aspect: If audit would be only
ﬁnanced out of the declared incomes, agents would have an interest in coordinating each
other actions on the zero-declaration-equilibrium. Hence ﬁscal income would be zero and
no audit could take place in the next period.
The probability of audit πt is common knowledge at the beginning of period t.T h e
production function of the public good is g(αtTt) with g0(.) > 0, g00(.) < 0.
Because we are dealing with a public good, each agent beneﬁts from the production
function g(.) without preventing the other agents from consuming the same level g(.).
Furthermore, the level of public good enjoyed by Agent i d e p e n d sb o t ho nh i sd e c l a r a t i o n
and on the declarations of all other agents. The redistributional eﬀect has an impact on
the strategy of each agent since they make a trade-oﬀ between an expected increase of
their revenue through evasion and bearing a reduction in the level of public good.
Lastly, we denote r the discount rate of wealth through time.
Optimal Strategy of Fraud
After having observed his revenue for period t but before knowing the realization
of αt and of Tt,A g e n ti will declare the amount xt
i which maximizes his expected net
revenue Xt










































, ∀s ≥ 0 (4)
The second term in the current wealth Xt
i is the gain expected from redistribution,
namely from the production of the public good. It is evaluated in expectation because
6The past cumulated revenue is constant for the agent at date t, so that we chose not to incorporate
it in the objective function, for sake’s simplicity and without implication on the result as shown by
Rickard et al. (1982).
7the agent does not know at the beginning of the period how many taxes will be collected
from the other agents. The third term is the tax that Agent i pays to the authorities
with respect to the declared revenue xt
i plus the amount of penalties and the unpaid
taxes recovered by the authorities in the case of audit. If the agent decides not to evade,
this last term is equal to τwt
i. The second term in (3) is the expected discounted wealth
of future periods. Since the audit probability for the next period depends on the current
collected taxes, the decision to evade in the current period has an impact on the future
wealth and, thus, on the future strategy. We have to deal with a dynamic decision
process.









i to Program (3) satisﬁes 0 <x t
i <w t































with a = τ(1 + β)
(1−αt)
C.N . Details of the calculus are given in Appendix.
Expression (6) can be interpreted in terms of standard marginal cost and beneﬁt.
The left-hand-side term corresponds to the expected marginal beneﬁt of honnesty. For
each additional euro declared, the agent obtains some beneﬁt from the increase in the
production of the public good in the current period. He also obtains an expected gain
from the marginal production of the public good in the next period because a proportion
(1−αt) of the declared euro will be invested in the next audit policy. The right-hand-side
term is the expected marginal cost of honnesty. It is equal to the declared euro “lost”
by the agent if declared plus the increase in the threat of being audited, and detected,
in the next period if he decides to cheat in t +1(i.e. if ∆
t+1
i > 0). Notice that the
expected net revenue Xt
i of the agent is non linear in xt
i. Hence with our setting, it is
possible to obtain interior solutions in contrast to Rickard et al. (1982)7.F u r t h e r m o r e
7Actually, the authors focus on the rate of evasion, which can only be equal to 1 (100% of the taxable
8s i n c ee a c hp e r i o di sa ﬀected by the previous one through the audit probability (recall
Equation (2)), the decision process is a markovian process in this model.
The results of this simple model are summarized as Proposition 1 hereafter.
Proposition 1
i) Other things being equal, the redistribution process through the production of a
public good induces a decrease of evasion compared to a system without redistribution.
ii) If the penalty rate is suﬃciently high, an increase in the probability of audit leads
to a increase in the declared income. Precisely:
dxt
i














The solution of Program (3) is not a scalar but a best response function xt
i(.) of
Agent i depending on the strategies of the other agents. Hence, we obtain a unique Nash
equilibrium for each given vector of strategies of the other agents.
Our approach allows us to enhance the important role played by the public good
provision on the agents’ behavior. Taking into account the public good induces two
opposite eﬀects: First, the agent has additionnal incentives to be honnest to allow the
authorities to produce more public good. Second, it induces the agent to evade a little
bit more since he knows that the declared incomes of the other agents also contribute to
the production of the public good. This is Point ii) of Proposition 1: More audit yields
more expected tax and, consequently, more expected public good for the agent, which
revenue is evaded) or 0 (the agent is honnest) at optimum in their model.
9may compensate the increase in the expected penalty in the case of detected evasion8.
Thus the penalty rate must be suﬃciently high to push the agent to evade less if, for an
exogenous reason, the audit probability increases: investing in the public good must be
more proﬁtable at the margin than the activity of fraud.
Until now, we have implicitely assumed that the production of the public good is a
proﬁtable activity. Actually, one important aim of the authorities is to ensure that the
production of the public good is socially welfare improving at each period. Hence we
must be sure that producing g(.) is proﬁtable. We focus on this point in Section 4. In
the following section, we still assume that a public good is produced and we propose to
analyze retroactive audit as a way for the authorities to give, under some conditions,
more incentives to agents to reduce evasion and also to obtain more funds for ﬁnancing
audit.
3 Retroactive audit
Assume now that, when an agent has evaded at period t and is caught, then the Au-
thorities pursue the audit on a number k of periods preceeding the current one, with
0 ≤ k ≤ t−1. In such a situation, the agent will have to reimburse all evaded taxes and
to pay the penalty β for each euro evaded from period t − k to period t.
Let us denote zt
i the amount that Agent i declares in a retroactive system and Zt
i his
expected net revenue at date t.A g e n ti still earns a taxable income wt
i which is random
at the beginning of each period t.
The total amount of taxes and penalties collected by the authorities at the end of



































8If g00(.)=0 ,t h er a t i odxt
i/dπt obtained in Appendix is no longer deﬁned. This is consistent with
our setting: if the marginal productivity of the public good were linear, the optimum would always be
a corner solution: either the agent would evade all his revenue or nothing.
10with b z
q
j being the amount of income eﬀectively taken into account by the authorities














j may still be conﬁscated in period t if a retroactive audit takes




j, either the agent was honnest in period q or he was caught and
there is no more undeclared revenue in period q so that max(.;.) equals zero. Audit of
the preceeding periods takes place only if the agent has cheated in the current period.
This is taken into account by using the indicator function 1{zt
j<wt
j},w h i c hi sw o r t h1 if
the agent has cheated (i.e. if zt
j <w t
j) and zero otherwise.







Let us denote Λ
t+s
i the incomes, evaluated at Period t,t h a tA g e n ti will have hidden









i , ∀s,∀i, (9)
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11In Equality iii) of (10) evaded taxes in the future will be collected only if they were not









For instance, hidden taxes in Period m = t are still available in period t+s only if they
have not been conﬁscated as a consequence of earlier audit at the previous dates, i.e.
with probabilities (1 − πt+l),w i t hl =0 ,...,s − 1, or if the agent was honnest in Period
t+l (so that no retroactivity takes place): this explains the term πm+l.1{∆m+l
i =0}.N o w
w ea r ea b l et od e ﬁne precisely the total taxes collected by the authorities at date t + s

















,∀s ≥ 0 (11)










































, ∀s ≥ 0, (13)
(9), (10) and (11).
Besides, the cost of an audit occuring at date t is now ct(k). c is a function of k
with c0(k) > 0 and c(0) = C (no retroactivity): It becomes increasingly costly for the
regulator as he investigates more remote periods. This information will be useful in the
next section, when we will focus on the constraint of the regulator.
Because of the indicator function, the expected net revenue (12) of the agent displays
a discontinuity at point zt
i = wt
i.T h u sw eh a v et oa n a l y z et w os e p a r a t es i t u a t i o n s :T h e
amount of revenue zt
i that the agent declares if he decides to evade, and the conditions





The ﬁrst question is investigated by focusing on the ﬁrst order condition related to
the situation in which the agent evades, that is when 1{zt
i<wt
i} =1 .
12Lemma 1 When Agent i decides to evade, the optimal declared amount of revenue zt
i






















































































L e tu si n t e r p r e t ee a c ht e r mi n( 1 4 ) . I fk =0(no retraoctivity), O, P, Q and Λ
t+s
i
equal zero and we obtain the ﬁrst order condition (6) of the model without retroactivity.
Consider now the case k>0. Still here, the audit probability of period t+1depends
on the strategy chosen by the agent in period t (see Equation (8)). The diﬀerence with
the model without retroactivity is that not only period t +1is concerned, but also all













The right-hand-side term in (14) is the expected marginal cost of declaring one ad-
ditional unit of revenue. It is similar to the marginal cost in the previous model, except
that the impact of retroactivity must be added. This explains the added term Λ
t+1
i in
the brackets. Recall that for each unit of revenue that is declared in t,ap a r t(1 − αt)
will ﬁnance the audit policy in Period t +1(determined by the audit probability πt+1).
13The left-hand-side term is the expected marginal beneﬁt of declaring one additional
Euro. The ﬁrst line deals with the direct redistributional eﬀect. The declared unit is
split into the production of the public good today (Period t) and the probability of
audit tomorrow (recall Equ. (8)), thus increasing the production of the public good also
tomorrow (in Period t +1 ). Here again, the fact that retroactivity takes place in the




j in the brackets. This
ﬁrst line is close to the one in (6). It is immediate to see that retroactivity increases
both the marginal cost and the marginal beneﬁti nP e r i o dt and t +1 .T h i s p r e v e n t s
us to conclude about its immediate total eﬀect on the behavior of the agent. Indeed,
while retroactivity increases the beneﬁt of being ”more” honnest because it permits it
to collect more taxes for the production of the public good, it also increases the threat
of being caught to cheat in the next period by increasing πt+1.
Nevertheless more can be said by looking at the second line of (14). For k>0, P is
positive, while O and Q are negative. Indeed, we show in Section 4 that the expression




O and Q is negative10 for any agent j: an increase in the audit probability in Period t+1
decreases the chances to conﬁscate ∆t
i or ∆
t+1
i i nt h ef u t u r e .T h et e r mi nP deals with
t h ei m p a c to ft h ep e n a l t yo nt h ee x p e c t e dn e tr e v e n u eo ft h ea g e n t .I ti sp o s i t i v e :t h ef a c t
that the agent will have to pay, in addition to the hidden taxes, a penalty in the case of
an audit increases the marginal beneﬁt of declaring one additional unit of revenue. The
expression in O and in Q represents the impact of declaring more today on the expected
net revenue in the future (Periods t +1until periods t + k +1 ). It corresponds to the
future impact of retroactivity on the marginal consumption of the public good minus
the future impact of retroactivity on the revenues that may be conﬁscated.Actually, the







































i =0} − 1
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which is negative or equal to zero.
14term, in Q, is relative to the fact that the revenues evaded in periods t+s (s ≥ 1)h a v e
l e s sc h a n c e st ob ec o n ﬁscated in periods t+s+m (with m ≥ 1) because the probability
to be conﬁscated immediately, than means during the period where they are hidden by
t h ea g e n t ,i n c r e a s e ss i n c em o r ef u n d sa r ea l l o c a t e dt ot h ea u d i tp o l i c y . T h i se ﬀect is
obtained by contagion. Part of the declared revenue today is aﬀected to the audit policy
for tomorrow, which increases the threat of being caught cheating. But, in doing so, it
lessens the chances of this evaded revenue to be conﬁs c a t e di nt h ef u t u r ea n da l l o c a t e d
to the public good in the future.
Finally the terms in O, P and Q display the fact that the taxes collected in Period
t + s depend on the strategy of the Agent in previous periods. They appear in the
ﬁrst order condition (14), while being absent from the condition obtained in the model
without retroactivity. Still notice that O equals zero if the agent dost not evade in Period
t +1( i nf o o t n o t e9 ,w ew o u l dh a v e∆
t+1
i =0 , 1{∆t+1
i =0} =1and 1{∆t+1
i =0} − 1=0 ).
Such as it stands, we are not able to conclude about the level of zt
i in optimum.
Is it higher or lower than the amount of revenue xt
i that is declared in the absence of
retroactivity? Proposition 2 goes a step further.
Proposition 2 Consider a risk neutral agent who decides to evade a positive amount of
revenue. Assume that ∂πt+1
∂Tt = ∂πt+1
∂Γt .
An eﬃcient policy provides a positive rate β of penalty and announces a constant
and strictly positive productivity of the public good. Formally, such an admissible policy
satisﬁes g0(.)=g>0 and β is such that
(1 + β)

























Proof. See Appendix ¥
Agents must be aware of the production of public good so that they have incentives to
declare more revenue in order to contribute to its production. Nevertheless, they should
not know all the characteristics of the production function, especially if it displays some
concavity. Indeed they may not be willing to declare more than a given level of revenue
15because of the decreasing productivity. In that sense, the governement could announce
that each agent will beneﬁt in a proportional way from the production of the public
good.
Furthermore, if the impact of the increase in the future audit probability following the
declaration of one additional unit is negative (that means, it induces incentives to cheat
more today), the government should increase the penalty to a level that counterbalance
the willingness of the agent to hide this unit. This is the case if the expression at right in
(15) is positive11. If retroactivity has a net positive eﬀect on the behavior of the agent,
then this expression is negative and Inequality (15) is always satisﬁed.
As a limit case, if the agent is audited at each period, retroactivity will never play
ar o l es i n c ea l lt h er e v e n u ew o u l db ec o n ﬁscated at each period: Λ
t+s
i =0∀s,∀j. Then
O,P and Q become equal to zero and (14) is reduced to (6). Nevertheless, this is only
possible either when the probability of audit equals one12 or if the agents are particularly
unlucky!
Finally, once Agent i decides to evade at date t, retroactivity has only a (direct) eﬀect
on the amount of revenue he decides to evade through the contagion eﬀect on the future.
T h ef a c tt h a tp a s tr e v e n u em a yb ec o n ﬁscated has no eﬀect. Indeed, he cannot change
anything in the preceeding periods in the case of an audit. This result is interesting for it
enhances that, essentially, the future is important here: it is concerned by retroactivity
and the agent can aﬀect it through the strategy he decides to adopt today.






11Recall that the left member must always be positive: Indeed 1−πt(1+β) must be positive otherwise
the agent would always have an interest in sheating. This implies that the value of β is upper bounded
by 1 − πt/πt.
12In that case, the agents never sheat because of the penalty.
16Proposition 3 Agent i evades less frequently under retroactive audit than under non-
retroactive audit if a constant marginal productivity of the public good is announced.
If all other agents are honnest, he has always less incentives to cheat whatever the
productivity of the public good.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
According to Proposition 3 retroactivity may induce less frequent evasion behavior.
Actually the consumption of the public good adds some wealth to the agent and it may
counterbalance the ﬁrst eﬀect if the productivity of the public good is high. As a limit
case, if the agent considers a ﬁxed impact of the public good on his expected net revenue,
he will always evade less frequently than in a case without retroactivity. From a policy
viewpoint, the authorities should communicate on how they reinvest the collected taxes
because, thanks to Proposition 1, we know that it may induce less fraud. However, they
should also restrict the information released, especially when the productivity of the
public good is high. If the agent is aware of the productivity, he will make a tradeoﬀ
between more penalty if audited and more public good since everyone may be audited
and retroactivity takes place.
Impact of the audit probability on the agent’s expected revenue
To obtain all eﬀects of πt o nt h ea g e n t ’ sb e h a v i o r ,w eh a v et od e r i v a t eh i se x p e c t e d




i equals zero in optimum, we obtain:
dZt
i



















From (11), ∂Γt/∂πt > 0, so that the sign of (16) is undetermined. Nevertheless,
if collected taxes and penalties were allocated to another sector and not to the agents
that paid them, the public good eﬀect would vanish (i.e. the second term) and the sign
13Even if this technique is the one used to obtain the ﬁrst order conditions of an optimization program,
this is not what we are doing here since πt is imposed to the agent. He cannot decide it.
17of dZt
i/dπt would be immediate: an increase in the probability of audit would always
deteriorate the expected net revenue of the agent, other things being equal. Only the
negative eﬀect through the penalty would have an impact on Z.
When the agents know that taxes are allocated to the public good, the impact of a
harcher audit policy is not so straighforward. The ﬁrst term in Equality (16) is posi-
tive while the second term is negative. The total impact on Zt
i is summarized in the
proposition hereafter.
Proposition 4 A harsher audit policy may improve the expected net revenue of a dis-
honnest agent. It is always the case if the agent is honnest.
When the authorities increase the probability of audit, they increase the chances of
Agent i being caught if he has evaded, but they also increase his expected net revenue
through the increase in the total amount of public good. Hence a dishonnest agent may
have an interest in a harsher audit policy: His expected net revenue may increase if the
individuals who evade are more frequently caught. This positive impact is systematic if




4 Optimal investment decision of the regulator
Up to now, we implicitely assumed that the public good is always produced. Nevertheless,
the regulator has to cope with both the ﬁnancing contraint and the maximization of
the social welfare. In such a situation, he must decide on the optimal rate αt∗ of the
collected taxes and penalties that he will engage in the production of the public good.
The remaining part will be dedicated to the audit activity in the next period. The
decision of the government is an endogenous variable in this model: it depends on the
behavior of the agents.
The regulator must also decide the length k of retroactivity in the second model.
We assume that he decides the level of αt after audit has taken place, so that, when
18determining αt, the regulator considers realized values for g(.).B u tk is decided at the
beginning of the period. Denote h(.) the function that measures the eﬃciency of the
future audit, knowing the rate (1−αt) of the current taxes dedicated to it. If h(.) is the
identity function this means that one Euro of current taxes invested in the future audit
yields one Euro of beneﬁt. Formally, we assume that 0 <h ((1 − αt)Tt) ≤ (1 − αt).T t
and 0 <h 0(.) < 1.T h el e v e lo fe ﬃciency is assumed to be exogenous and deterministic
here.
Audit without retroactivity
Let us denote Wt the expected social welfare at date t when no retroactivity takes



















j deﬁned by (4).14
The decision of the regulator at date t will have an impact on the future, through
the proportion (1 − αt) of current taxes and penalties reserved for the ﬁnancing of the
future audits.
The ﬁrst order condition of Program (17-18) yields:
0 < α
















Since Tt is known from the regulator when he decides αt∗,i ti se q u i v a l e n tt o
0 < α










It is worth noticing that the left-hand-side term concerns Period t, while the right-
hand-side term is related to Period t +1since h(.) is the eﬃciency of the audit in the
next period.
14See page 6 for a discussion of Constraint (18).
19The government has to make a trade-oﬀ between producing the public good in the





































The second and the third case must be discussed. If αt∗ =1 ,t h e na l lt h ea g e n t s
may have an interest in hiding all their revenue in the next period since no audit will
be ﬁnanced. A direct consequence is that no taxes will be available for the production
o ft h ep u b l i cg o o d :w ew i l lh a v ea te q u i l i b r i u mi nP e r i o dt +1 : Tt+1 =0and g(0) = 0.
Hence a high production of the public good in the current period may lead to no public
good in the next period!
I nt h eo p p o s i t et h i r dc a s e ,αt∗ =0and no public good is produced in the current
p e r i o d .T h i si se s p e c i a l l yt h ec a s ei ft h ea u d i tt e c h n o l o g yi ss oe ﬃc i e n tt h a ta l lf u n d sa r e
invested in audit for the next period. Nevertheless, taxes are not needed and the ﬁscal
rate τ should be equal to zero at equilibrium.
Retroactive audit
In the case with retroactivity, the regulator must choose αt and the length k of
retroactivity15 that are solution to the following program:
15Actually, the regulator will seek information in the past only if the agent is kept frauding at date t
after an audit. Hence the total cost of audit should be composed of the cost C for the current period
and a function depending on k and multiplied by 1{∆t
i>0}. Because this indicator function induces a
discontinuity at date t when derivating with respect to k, we choose to work with a continuous function,
namely c(k) which occurs for each audit. The important point here is that this function is increasing



















The private revenues Zt
j are considered with respect to either realized values of income
or expected values, depending on which parameter, αt or k,i st ob ed e t e r m i n e˙ d.



































































τ(1 + β)πt (23)
From (10) we have that
∂Λt
j
∂k > 0 ∀j.T h e ﬁrst term in (23) displays the positive
eﬀect of retroactivity for Society: more expected collected taxes induce more money
for the production of the public good, and the intensity of this positive eﬀect depends
simultaneously on the productivity of the public good and on the eﬃciency of the audit
policy. The second term is the negative eﬀect of an increase in k directly borne by the
agents, that means the increase in the taxes (and penalties) collected in the current
period and coming from past behaviors. The ratio in the righ-hand-side term deals with
the marginal cost of audit.
215C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have shown that if taxpayers take into account the ﬁnancing of the
production of public goods through taxes, they tend to evade less of their income than in
a system without information on redistribution. Besies, the fact that agents incorporate
in their expected revenue the consumption of a public good, i.e. a redistribution of
collected taxes, has diﬀerent eﬀects on their behavior. First, they are more likely to
report truthfully because the collected taxes are redistributed in units of the public
good. Second, there is a negative eﬀect, leading to more tax evasion since an additional
Euro can either be obtained from an increase of the consumption of the public good or
an increase in the evaded income, for a given audit probability. Besides, we have also
s h o w nt h a tar i c h e ra g e n ti n c r e a s e st h ea m o u n to fd e c l a r e di n c o m ei ft h ep e n a l t yr a t ei s
suﬃciently high. But this does not mean that the percentage of fraud decreases since our
model is based on monetary amounts of incomes and not on shares of taxable incomes.
Another interesting result deals with the impact of the audit probability on the
agents’ behavior. In a standard model without redistribution, an increase in the audit
probability leads to a deterioration of the ﬁnancial situation of the agent. In our model
this is not always the case because the agent can have a beneﬁt from a harsher audit
policy, through the increase of the total expected taxes and penalties collected and used
to produce the public good. These results hold both in the simple model and in the
model with retroactivity.
Retroactivity may enter in conﬂi c tw i t ht h ew a yt h ea g e n tc o n s i d e r st h er e d i s t r i b u t i o n
process in his expected wealth. Precisely, retroactivity always leads to more expected
collected taxes and penalties, thus to more expected public good provision. If the pro-
ductivity of the public good is high, the agent has an incentive to decrease his level of
declared revenue. Nevertheless, we state suﬃcient conditions under which retroactivity
leads to more honnest income reporting. Moreover our results suggest the opportunity
for the government to use communication as an additional tool for ﬁghting ﬁscal fraud.
Indeed it may be worth not divulgating all the information about the productivity of
22the production function of the public good; especially, if agents believe that the produc-
tivity is constant, they always have an incentive to declare more revenue in a system
with retroactivity. Taking a point of view of “positive economics”, our model also sug-
gests that such a ﬁscal system is eﬃcient if agents are boundedly rational, which might
correspond to the use of a constant marginal productivity.
Our results are of particular interest with respect to ﬁscal policy because incomes have
to be reported periodically, and current income declarations are not independent from
past declarations. These characteristics can also be found in environmental issues, for
example when pollution is not sudden, but appears after some accumulation of emissions.
In these situations, it is not the emission by one source that leads to the pollution of a site,
but the repeated emissions of several polluters. And when the pollution is discovered, the
rehabilitation of the polluted area may take a long time and may also call for repeated
actions through time. This is especially the case for groundwater polluted by agricultural
fertilizers, which contain nitrates. Lands are fertilized one or several times each year,
depending on the type of good that is cultivated (meal, corn, potatoes, ...) and also on
the type of land. It is particularly diﬃcult for a regulator to observe the agricultural
practices of farmers without some costly investigations so that we have to deal wih
moral hazard in a dynamic principal-agent relationship. Several papers have stressed
the usefulness of random audit schemes (Mookherjee and Png, 1990, 1992; Picard, 1996,
2000). Here they would depend on the physical properties of the cultivated land and
also on the past climate. The cost of an audit in such a context deals with the cost of
obtaining consistent data through a precise analysis of the land and of the inﬁltration
process of nitrates in the groundwater. Most of the existing economic studies deal with
static models and audit that would depend on the past of the agent, here the farmer,
was never analyzed up to now (except by Harrington (1988)). This can be done with
our model. Instead of declaring an amount of income agents announce a level of eﬀort,
that would ﬁt with a given agricultural practice. For instance, fertilizing in several times
during the year, reducing the quantities of fertilizers, cultivating some plants during
the winter that capture the exceeding nitrates still present in the soil, etc. Hence the
23regulator will have to audit in order to be sure that the environmental advice that was
given to the farmers at the beginning of the period was respected. This audit should
provide information about the agricultural practices during the current period but also
on the past periods if the level of pollution in the soil cannot be attributed to actions
undertaken only during the current period. The way the regulator communicates with
the farmers is also particularly important here: the farmer must know how his eﬀorts
aﬀect environmental quality and how much he beneﬁts from the increase in the quality
of the groundwate˙ r. This point is not so easy as with tax policy because the farmer
does not need high quality water for irrigation so that he may not be convinced by a
redistribution process. Nevertheless, he may be sensitive to environmental insights if
this could have a positive impact on his expected revenue. Hence such an argument calls
for the implementation of subsidies that would be connected to the results of the audit.
Environmentally friendly actions by farmers should be ﬁnancially supported, at least at
the beginning of a process of changing agricultural practice or technology. This means
that in our model, it would be interesting to consider not only monetary sanctions in
the case of a deviation but also retributions, because agents are not necessarily frauding
when they do not follow some given advice and do worse than required.
There are several interesting possible developments of the previous model. First,
introducing imperfect auditing schemes may be useful. In many practical applications
the audit does not always detect shirkers. Therefore, if the aim is to obtain a given
target level of fraud, it will be necessary to compensate the imperfectness of the audit
by a larger penalty on a longer retroactivity period. Second, risk aversion may play
an important role. Indeed retroactivity may have a larger impact when agents are risk
averse. Other interesting theoretical developments should deal with inﬁnite horizons,
continous time and also discounting. This is not taken into account in our model.
Finally it would be useful to test the impact of retroactivity on “real people”. Fraud
prevention policies are widespread, but while the cost of the policy is known with some
accuracy, the beneﬁts are hardly known. Nevertheless, many countries rely on it. It
would be much more eﬃcient to have a detailed account about the impact of retroactivity.
24We suggest therefore that an experimental investigation would be useful (this work is in
progress).
APPENDIX
First order condition (6)

































































From (4), (1), (2) and with (5) we have
∂Xt
i















































With a = τ(1 + β)
(1−αt)
C.N , we obtain the ﬁrst order condition (6).
Q.E.D. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1.
i) Consider (6). With g0(.) > 0, the expected marginal beneﬁt of honnesty is higher
than in a system with no redistribution, while the expected marginal cost remains un-
changed.
ii) At o t a ld i ﬀerentiation of (6) w.r.t. πt and xt
i yields
⎡





















































































(1 − (1 + β)πt).τ.
⎛












The numerator is positive. The term into brackets at the denominator is negative.
H e n c et h i sr a t i oi sp o s i t i v ei fa n do n l yi f1 − (1 + β)πt < 0,i . e .β > πt
1−πt.







































































(1 − (1 + β)πt).τ.
⎛












The numerator is positive, while the denominator is positive if and only if 1 − (1 +
β)πt < 0.
Q.E.D. ¥


































































































1 − πt(1 + β)
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∂πt+1 ∀s>1 and ∂Γt+1







































∂πt+1 = −τ.(1 + β)πt+s.
∂Λt+s
i
∂πt+1 ∀s>1 and ∂Zt+1







































































































































































































and a last arrangement, we obtain the ﬁrst order condition (14).
Q.E.D. ¥
28P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .























































From the second order conditions, we will have that zt
i ≥ xt
i i fa n do n l yi fE x p r e s s i o n( 2 4 )
is positive.
Because g00(.) ≤ 0 by assumption and Γt ≥ Tt because of retroactivity, the term in the
ﬁrst line is negative. So does the term in the second line for the same reasons.The sign of the
third line is undetermined. In the fourth line, the expression in P is positive (see in the text),





















































It is positive, thus yieldingzt
i ≥ xt


























Nevertheless, such an assumption would weaken our approach. Recall that we want to consider
the case where agents are heterogenous, so that the regulator does not know who is lying and
who is honnest within the population.
29Proof of Proposition 3
By denoting Γt,h (respectively Γt,e) the collected taxes and penalties in the case where

















































We have to compare this situation to the one without retroactive penalty. In a simple

























j (and similarly for Γt,e = Tt,e). A limited
development of each term in Γt,. in the neighborhood of Tt,. and a rearrangement of (25)














































The left-hand-side term in (26) is identical to the one of (27). The right-hand-side












































































From the (next) section 4, the second term is always negative. The ﬁrst one is positive
because g0(.) < 0 and Tt,e <T t,h.I fg0(αtTt,e) − g0(αtTt,h) is not too high, Expression
(28) may be negative so that retroactivity lessens the interest of Agent i to evade. As
30a limit case, if the agent considers g0(.) as a constant, the ﬁrst term disappears and he
always evades less frequently in the retroactive system than in a simple one.




j =0 ,a n dt h eﬁrst term
in (28) disappears, so that the right-hand-side term in (27) is lower than the one in (26).
This yields the second result in Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
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